Introduction
This year has been marked by increasing tensions between China and the Philippines in territorially disputed regions of the South China Sea, highlighting Beijing's assertive and coercive small state diplomacy. This situation is aptly captured by Thucydides' quote: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." However, alongside this realist perspective, China has also been warmly engaging with leaders from small South Pacific island states, presenting another dimension to its relations with smaller nations. This diplomatic engagement has predominantly focused on the realm of security, which has not yet received adequate attention. Indeed, since the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) by Chinese President Xi in April 2022, China has actively pursued the implementation of the GSI in its two priority peripheral regions – mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. However, its influence has expanded beyond these borders, increasingly extending into regions such as the South Pacific. The relevance of China’s small state diplomacy under the GSI cannot be ignored or downplayed, as it epitomises how China paves the way for "westlessness", a rebalanced world in which the West remains ever-present but ever-less dominant. The article tackles the question of how small states factor into China’s diplomacy and, with a focus on China’s forays into several small Pacific Island states in the sphere of security, how the People’s Republic uses its small state diplomacy to shape a new era of "westlessness."
Chinese diplomacy has long adhered to the axiom articulated by China’s former President Hu Jintao: "big powers are the key, neighbours are paramount, developing countries are the foundation, and [m]ultilateralism is an important stage" (Swaine, 2014, p. 3). This strategic framework categorises states into major powers, peripheral nations, and developing countries. While it may appear that Chinese strategic discourse overlooks the existence or significance of small states, it nonetheless provides indirect references to them.
China’s approach to its relations with small states has been mostly framed in the broader rhetorical emphasis on equality in international relations. Historically, Chinese leadership has underscored the principle of treating "all countries, regardless of size, as equals," dating back to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence introduced at the 1955 Bandung Conference (Boon and Ardy, 2017). This principle remains the defining feature of President Xi Jinping’s new international order, where big countries are urged to treat smaller ones as equals (Rudd, 2024).
Despite this indirect acknowledgement, direct references to small states have largely been absent from China's hierarchical diplomatic framework. The oversight can be attributed to China prioritising more salient actors during the Cold War (1949–1989) and, to some extent, in the post-Cold War era (1992–present). The rationale for this emphasis on select actors is closely tied to the two grand strategies – survival and rejuvenation – that China has adopted since 1949 (Goldstein, 2020).
Small States Factor in China’s Diplomacy: From Mao to Xi
In the early days of the PRC, China was poor and militarily weak compared to the two superpowers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. These superpowers presented significant external military threats, exemplified by the deployment of U.S. forces to defend South Korea during the Korean War, which instilled heightened concerns within China regarding its national security. As a consequence, China’s only recourse was to embrace the grand strategy of survival by turning to one of the superpowers as a counterbalance to the perceived threat from the other (Goldstein, 2020).
When Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, he continued this survival strategy while facing internal pressures due to economic stagnation. Deng emphasised the need for a peaceful international environment to enable economic modernisation, advocating for friendly relations with neighbouring countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2024) However, China's attention remained largely on domestic issues, influenced by the geopolitical shifts following the Soviet Union's collapse and the political unrest of 1989 (Goldstein, 2020).
By 1992, as foreign military threats diminished, China shifted to a strategy of national rejuvenation, aiming to restore its status as a great power. Deng promoted a cautious and low-profile approach, encapsulated in his directive to "hide your strength, bide your time." However, supported by rapid economic growth, subsequent leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao adopted a more proactive stance labelled as "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development", aimed at reassuring others that a stronger China posed no threat. This shift fostered enhanced diplomatic relations with small states, particularly in Africa and Latin America (Oqubay, 2019; Alden and Mendez, 2023).
Under Xi Jinping, China’s grand strategy of rejuvenation evolved further. Following China's successful hosting of the 2008 Olympics and its pivotal role in mitigating the Global Financial Crisis, Xi openly recognised the nation’s strength and wealth. Consequently, he abandoned Deng’s cautious approach and Jiang-Hu’s strategy of "peaceful rise," opting for a more assertive "striving for achievement" strategy (Rudd, 2023).
A key objective of this approach, as noted by Chinese political scientist Shi Yinhong (2018), is to enhance China's strategic capabilities for greater economic and diplomatic leverage in Asia and beyond. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a primary vehicle for achieving these goals, positioning small states as crucial partners. Under Xi’s leadership, small states have emerged as "non-ignorable" elements in China’s global strategy to create a favourable international environment for its rise (Boon and Ardy, 2017). Wei Min (2015), a Chinese scholar specialising on the role of small states, eloquently encapsulates their significance by asserting that such countries occupy a strategic position in geopolitics, enabling China to realise its foreign policy objectives.
In light of this, senior Chinese officials, including Xi, have increasingly engaged in high-profile visits to small states or hosted their leaders in China. These efforts aim to build a coalition of small states that it can mobilise to challenge major power rivals, namely the United States, enhance China's leverage at the United Nations, and better shape the international order to align with its interests, advancing the notion of "westlessness."
China’s "Westlessness" Moonshot under the GSI: Engagement with Small South Pacific Island States
The concept of "westlessness" became a central theme at the 56th Munich Security Conference (MSC) in February 2020. The MSC report highlighted that "[...] far-reaching power shifts in the world and rapid technological change contribute to a sense of anxiety and restlessness. The world is becoming less Western. But more importantly, the West itself may become less Western, too" (Munich Security Conference, 2020, p. 6). As further argued in the report, the West's decline is largely attributed to the rise of non-Western countries, particularly China. Helena Legarda, an expert at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, "... Beijing’s rise and its growing influence on economic, political, and security issues are having a clear impact on the Western-led world order" (Legarda, 2020).
As the "westlessness" term approaches its fourth year, King's College scholar Samir Puri has provided a nuanced perspective. According to Oxford Professor Rana Mitter, Puri makes a clear argument that "westlessness" signifies the "declining slice of the global pie" held by the West as the world progresses toward a more diverse global future (Mitter, 2024). This does not mean the West's role is diminishing entirely; rather, it is becoming less dominant, while China’s rise presents opportunities for countries seeking to modernise independently of Western influence (Olander, 2024). Puri’s "westlessness" aptly describes the current dynamics unfolding in the South Pacific region under China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Since the launch of the GSI in April 2022, China has sought to promote it as a vision for a new international order in which the Republic assumes a greater security role. The manifestations of the initiative have started to take shape not only in mainland Southeast- and Central Asia, where China’s security interests have grown, but also in the South Pacific islands, including the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji, particularly in the form of projects regarding cooperation in policing and domestic security.
In the past five years, the Solomon Islands has increased its alignment with Beijing under Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, who implemented a pro-China "Look North" policy (Novak, 2024). Notably, he shifted diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, signing security pacts that allow China to send armed police and military personnel to assist with local policing and training. Newly elected Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele has also committed to strengthening security and economic ties with Beijing, emphasising collaboration to develop new industries during his recent state visit (Dziedzic, 2024).
Similarly, China has demonstrated its security ambitions in Vanuatu by signing a policing equipment deal and sending police experts during the country’s political crisis in 2023 (Needham, 2024). In a recent visit, Prime Minister Charlot Salwai expressed interest in China’s support for domestic security, visiting a Huawei factory to explore surveillance technology aimed at enhancing policing and reducing crime (Needham, 2024).
China has also expanded security cooperation with Fiji. Despite Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka initially signalling plans to cancel Fiji’s policing deal with China, he later reaffirmed the agreement, ensuring ongoing training for Fijian police and access to advanced policing and surveillance equipment (Batsani-Ncube, 2024). During his latest visit to China, he also expressed a desire to learn from China’s experiences in poverty alleviation and infrastructure development (Ziwen, 2024).
Looking Ahead: Slices of Global Pie Shared with China
These cases share a common trend that is unfolding in small island countries: China’s proliferating security footprint under the GSI, which is becoming even more entrenched and visible. While one could argue that China’s push for policing cooperation serves practical purposes—such as protecting its diaspora and infrastructure—its broader strategic agenda is paramount.
Small South Pacific islands hold a significant strategic position in geopolitics due to their locations, allowing China to compete for influence with traditional powers. Their votes at the UN General Assembly on issues regarding Taiwan and China's sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas are also crucial to Beijing.
Although Pacific governments have long relied on traditional partners like the United States and Australia, China's emergence offers these states additional sources of external security assistance. However, China's authoritarian policing style contrasts sharply with the democratic approach championed by Western powers (Dinnen and Zhang, 2024). This raises concerns that if non-Western entities like China begin to set norms and standards – particularly in policing practices – the world will drift away from Western influence.
Currently, small island nations that are in the South Pacific or in the other parts of the world are arguably weighing their options and increasingly recognising the benefits of deepening cooperation with China. This does not suggest that traditional Western partners will disappear; rather, it highlights a desire for diversification, with China presenting itself as an alternative. China's small state diplomacy, driven by Xi's strategy of "striving for achievement," exemplifies how swiftly it is cultivating ties with small states in the Global South through the GSI. As this strategy remains a priority for Chinese leadership, its small state diplomacy is expected to intensify, further propelling the world toward "westlessness."
This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Elze Pinelyte is an Associate Expert at Geopolitics and Security Studies Center (GSSC), where she studies China’s domestic politics and foreign policy, with a focus on Sino-EU relations and its recent developments. Elzė also is a contributing author at China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), where she analyses relations between China and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. She holds a bachelor’s degree in sinology from Vilnius University, certificates from Zhejiang and Shanghai Jiao Tong Universities, and a dual master’s degree in International Governance and Diplomacy, and International Relations from Sciences Po and Peking University.
This article was edited by Agnes Monti, Luca Rastelli, and Sardor Allayarov.
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