Recent polls show that European Conservatives and Reformists in EU policy-making will play a greater-than-ever role in the coming legislature. So will their unique stance on China.
The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) is a long-standing political group in the European Parliament (EP), created in 2009 under the name "Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists." The group, in which the British Conservatives were present in the last two legislatures before Brexit, now hosts a significant number of parties that can be classified as belonging to the radical right family of parties (Mair and Mudde, 1998). With 68 of the 705 existing members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the group in the EP is coordinated with the political party, the ECR party. This party is led by Italian Prime Minister and rising radical right leader Giorgia Meloni of Fratelli d'Italia (FdI). Other prominent members include Spanish MEP Jorge Buxadé – a member of VOX – and Polish MEP Radoslaw Fogiel of Law and Justice (PiS), both of whom serve as ECR vice presidents. Currently, these three parties, FdI, PiS, and VOX, together with the Belgian New Flemish Alliance (NVA), are the most represented in the EP political group, but the ECR is present in 14 of the 27 European Member States.
The ECR's position on European integration eludes clear definition. According to their official position they are a party based on ‘individual liberty, national sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, private property, limited government, free trade, family values and the devolution of power’ (ECR, 2024b, 2024c). These values underpin their idea of a reformed Europe, hence their name. It is precisely this stance on EU reform that distinguishes them from the EP's other radical right group, Identity and Democracy (ID), which has traditionally been more inclined to break with the EU, although it has recently moderated in order to appeal to a wider electorate.
The party's position on China is difficult to assess due to the plurality of opinions that come from each of the national delegations. One way to do this is to analyse the manifestos that political parties present for the European elections (Gómez-Hernández, 2024). Compared to other parties, the ECR mentions China only twice in its four-page manifesto. First, under the proposal "Driving global economic growth," the conservatives and reformists argue that de-risking would be the priority for them, following Commission President von der Leyen's de-risking plan and in contrast to the Biden administration (Euractiv, 2023). This is important because if this position were to be adopted, it would put additional strain on the already very tense EU-China relationship. Similarly, the push for de-risking against de-coupling differentiates the ECR from the more mainstream, but also right-wing, EPP.
The second mention of China in the manifesto is in relation to the geopolitical dynamics currently facing the EU. Here, the Conservatives take a more cautious approach to China in terms of international security, recognising ‘the need for engagement and the imperative to address human rights violations’ (ECR, 2024b). Similarly, they explicitly pledge to maintain strong ties with Taiwan. This could be interpreted as a Eurorealist vision of international relations (Steven and Szerbiak, 2023), which also explains their strong support for NATO.
The rest of the ECR manifesto does not deal with China beyond the points mentioned above. While this could be seen as the conservatives and reformists not being particularly interested in Beijing, it is easily explained by the length of their manifesto (only 4 pages) and the European nature of most of its sections (8 out of 10). By way of comparison, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia are mentioned only once each. This indicates the growing importance of China among European political parties, as opposed to traditional countries of interest.
Another document that can complement the more traditional manifesto analysis is the 2024-2029 ECR priorities (ECR Group, 2024a). Here, the economic and security approaches to China described above are backed up by other proposals on technology. In this policy area, the ECR party calls on the next Commission to develop a digital vision of the Union in order to be able to compete with other major powers such as the U.S., India or China. This reinforces the Eurorealist view that the Conservatives take on international relations.
One policy area that can help understand the ECR's position on China, even though the party does not link it to the Asian country, is its stance on climate change and the Green Deal. For the conservatives and reformists, the Green Deal is a purely domestic issue, more related to industry and technological innovation than to the international fight against climate change. They also focus on protecting farmers and make no reference to the recently agreed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This perception of climate change is in stark contrast to Europe's growing dependence on China for clean technology (Euractiv, 2024). However, they agree with the Chinese government on the key role that European and Chinese industries will play in the fight against climate change.
In this sense, the EP elections seem more relevant than ever to know how the only democratically elected European institution will stand on China. Despite the much-heralded rise of the radical right, it must be acknowledged that the ECR's gains will be limited. In May 2024, a Politico poll predicted a 6-seat gain for the Conservatives and Reformists. It is their ideologically neighboring party, Identity and Democracy, that capitalises on the increase in numbers of the radical right with a predicted increase of 27 seats (Politico Europe, 2024b). Despite this difference in potential gains, the ECR's role in the election of the next European Commission will be crucial, as they could be the kingmakers. Indeed, President von der Leyen may have indirectly acknowledged this with her statement about a possible alliance with the ECR during the Maastricht debate (Politico Europe, 2024a). If this is the case, it is safe to assume that the Commission's position on China will be tougher, following the line of the conservatives and reformists.
All in all, it is clear from the above analysis that the ECR's position on EU-China relations will be an important one in the coming years. Whether or not they eventually make it into the EP's informal governing coalition, their projected numbers will be sufficient to exert influence in plenary sessions in Strasbourg, and therefore the next Commission President will not be able to ignore them in his political calculations. Similarly, their growing numbers and strong Eurorealist position and support for Taiwan could bring the ECR further to the political table if tensions with China continue to escalate.
This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Unai Gómez-Hernández is a joint PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh and KU Leuven. His research interests include EU-China relations, radical right populist parties, geoeconomics, and electoral dynamics at the European level.
This article was edited by Mattia M. Sossio and Stefano Bertoli.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ECR Group, n.d./a. 2024-2029 priorities [Online]. Brussels: ECR Group. Available from: https://ecrgroup.eu/priorities [Accessed 7 May 2024].
ECR Group, n.d./b. Electoral Manifesto [Online]. Brussels: ECR Group. Available from: https://ecrparty.eu/2024/04/24/ecr-party-adopts-manifesto-for-european-elections-decides-not-to-put-forward-a-lead-candidate/ [Accessed 7 May 2024].
ECR Group, n.d./c. Who are we? [Online]. Brussels: ECR Group. Available from: https://ecrgroup.eu/ecr [Accessed 7 May 2024].
Euractiv, 2023. Von der Leyen wants ‘de-risking’ not ‘de-coupling’ in new China doctrine. Euractiv, 30 March. Available from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/news/von-der-leyen-wants-de-risking-not-de-coupling-in-new-china-doctrine/.
Euractiv, 2024. Europe ‘getting more dependent on China’ for clean tech, EU climate chief warns. Euractiv, 14 February. Available from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/europe-getting-more-dependent-on-china-for-clean-tech-eu-climate-chief-warns/.
Gómez-Hernández, 2024. European Parliament Elections Will Set the Tone for EU-China Relations. ChinaObservers, 12 April. Available from: https://chinaobservers.eu/european-parliament-elections-will-set-the-tone-for-eu-china-relations/.
Mair, P. and Mudde, C., 1998. The Party Family and Its Study. Annual Reviews, 1, pp.221-229. Available from: https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.211
Politico Europe, 2024a. Von der Leyen opens the door to Europe’s hard right. Politico Europe, 30 April. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/von-der-leyen-hard-right-maastricht-debate-giorgia-meloni-viktor-orban-schmit/.
Politico Europe, 2024b. What polls say. Politico Europe, 7 May. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/european-parliament-election/.
Steven, M. and Szczerbiak, A., 2023. Conservatism and ‘Eurorealism’ in the European Parliament: the European Conservatives and Reformists under the leadership of Poland’s Law and Justice. European Politics and Society, 24(5), pp.585–602. Doi: 10.1080/23745118.2022.2065725.
コメント