War in Ukraine has seriously tested China’s relationship with Russia. Having declared a “no-limits” partnership with Moscow on February 4th, 2022, Beijing has since faced several headaches. Russia’s actions have challenged its support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, jeopardized relations with Europe, and compounded Covid-19-related economic challenges (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2022).
Yet despite these challenges, one year since the start of Russia’s war of choice, the core of the relationship has not changed. According to Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman, the war “hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship” (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2022). The regimes in the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai share a world view where liberal democracy and the United States are their greatest ideological and security threats. Moreover, both are conscious of the increasing domestic challenges facing Western democracies and believe ‘the West’ is in perpetual decline (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2022). But while this means that the two see the time as ripe to challenge the US-dominated world order, the Kremlin’s penchant for destabilization remains at odds with Zhongnanhai’s preference for economic and political stability.
In this essay, I argue that it is precisely through this prism that China’s reaction to the war in Ukraine needs to be considered. Thus, rather than label Beijing ‘neutral’ or ‘pro-Russian,’ I contend that its positioning should be seen as a strategy of ‘hybrid support’ that assists the war effort while avoiding becoming a party to it.
Hybrid warfare, hybrid support?
First popularized by Frank Hoffman in his 2007 monograph Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, the concept of hybrid warfare has been defined by many in different ways (Solmaz, 2022). While its vagueness makes it a regular target of academic criticism, its flexibility also helps grasp the complexity of contemporary warfare. I settle on the following definition by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE, Online):
“An action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions are coordinated and synchronized and […] take place in the political, economic, military, civil or information domains. They are conducted using a wide range of means and designed to remain below the threshold of taction and attribution.”
Two elements of hybrid warfare are particularly key. First, the actor treads a fine line between war and peace, to “sow doubt in the minds of target populations” and prevent the target from opportunities to respond (Voyger, 2021). Second, the subject uses a range of military and non-military means in coordinated fashion to maximize chances of success.
A seminal example of hybrid warfare in action is Russia’s approach to Eastern Ukraine. While Putin’s ‘Special Military Operation’ started on February 24th of last year, Russia had technically been at war with Ukraine since February 2014. While traditional military troops fought in Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia labeled them ‘volunteers’ despite their Russian army guns, Russian license plates, and Russian accents. Others called them ‘little green men’ (BBC, 2014). This ambiguous approach to warfare made it difficult for Western powers to develop appropriate responses. Meanwhile, Russia organized a global disinformation campaign to legitimize its territorial claims, ultimately setting the stage for a full-scale invasion 8 years later. Through hybrid warfare, Russia therefore avoided attribution by never declaring open war and sowed doubt in the minds of the global audience with tailored propaganda.
‘Hybrid support’ works similarly. First, the actor treads a fine line between supporting and condemning a belligerent partner, to avoid attribution. Then, it uses a range of non-military means to support the war effort. Like hybrid warfare, it takes place in the political, economic, military, and information domains. I argue that this is what Beijing has been doing with the war in Ukraine.
The concept of hybrid warfare distinguishes between conventional (combat troops, open warfare) and non-conventional (disinformation, energy, migration) means. Likewise, hybrid support distinguishes between conventional (financial and military support) and non-conventional (political and narrative support) means to support a belligerent partner. Let’s assess Beijing’s actions across the two categories.
Conventional support
Overall, Beijing has carefully avoided violating Western sanctions or providing direct military support to Moscow (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2022). But it has still invested in developing the bilateral military and economic relationship. To show off close relations, the two countries flew joint patrols near Japanese and South Korean air defense zones in May during President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia (Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, 2022). China also joined Russia for its annual Vostok military drills in the far east in early September (Ferris and Nouwens, 2022) and for joint naval exercises near Japan in December (CNN, 2022).
Economically, China has not joined Western sanctions on Russia and has shown “no restraint in its trading with Russia,” according to Le Monde (Le Monde, 2022). China has scrambled for cheap Russian resources: Russian coal imports are at a 5-year high (Reuters, 2022) and Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as its top oil exporter in the Summer (Reuters, 2022). Meanwhile, Russia has become a top market for China’s currency, the Yuan. According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Yuan currency trades in the Moscow stock exchange were at 20% in July, up from 0.5% in January (Kommersant, 2022). Chinese smartphones and carmakers have also filled the void left by the departure of Western companies, becoming leaders in the Russian market (CNN, 2022).
Clearly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not discouraged China from deeper engagement. In addition, other episodes call into question the extent of China’s conventional support for Russia. For instance, the United States recently expressed concern about non-lethal military support for Russia overseen by Chinese companies with ties to the state (Euractiv, 2023). One such company – Spacety China – was sanctioned by the US for allegedly providing satellite imagery of Ukraine to the Wagner group, a Russian paramilitary organization heavily involved in the invasion of Ukraine (BBC, 2023). Still, it must be recognized that Beijing’s conventional support for Moscow has been limited, and at best, ambiguous.
Non-conventional support
There has been no ambiguity in Beijing's political support for Moscow, however. Even before the war, the “no-limits partnership” declaration (Russian Federation, 2022) – itself a re-iteration of a statement by vice-foreign Minister Le Yucheng in December 2021 (People’s Republic of China, 2021) – stands as a case in point. We will never know if Xi knew of Putin’s war plans when the two leaders met on February 4th, but it is plausible that having China standing behind him may have emboldened Putin to launch the invasion (Cox, 2022). In April, with the war well underway and Putin’s hopes of a quick victory disappearing (WSJ, 2022), Le Yucheng hailed strong Russia ties “no matter what” after meeting the Russian Ambassador (SCMP, 2022). In early September, Senior Chinese official Li Zhanshu then visited Moscow and expressed his “full understanding” of Russia’s actions in Ukraine while calling for stronger bilateral ties (Russian Federation, 2022).
Briefly in early September, it seemed like a rift was growing between the countries when Putin met Xi at a Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Uzbekistan and acknowledged China's “concerns” over Ukraine (Reuters, 2022). In hindsight, this was rather an example of the growing power asymmetry between the two countries. Later that same month, Beijing received Putin’s trusted National Security Chief Nikolai Patrushev, where he denounced the West for promoting “bogus” values and called for a further strengthening of ties (Reuters, 2022). In December, it was the turn of the Chairman of the United Russia Party, Dmitry Medvedev, to be warmly greeted in Beijing (TASS, 2022). In early January 2023, the Chinese and Russian Foreign Ministers Qin Gang and Sergey Lavrov praised their close personal relations in a phone call while condemning Europe and the United States (SCMP, 2023) for "provoking confrontation between them." As recently as this February, the new Chinese Ambassador to the European Union called on the EU to “stop calling for a complete victory” (Politico, 2023).
Despite Putin’s comments in Uzbekistan, the highest leadership echelon of the People’s Republic has chipped in with political support as well. In a phone call held a day before the New Year, a “good yearly tradition” in the words of Xi, the Chinese leader expressed his view that bilateral relations had become more “resilient, mature, and stable” during the past year to his Russian counterpart (People’s Republic of China, 2022). Furthermore, Xi is expected to visit Moscow in person this year (Time, 2023).
For China to be considered a ‘neutral’ country in the Ukrainian conflict, it would have needed to extend the same political support to Ukraine as it has to Russia. However, Ukrainian authorities complain about the difficulty of holding discussions with the Chinese side, small exceptions aside (People’s Republic of China, 2022). Presidents Xi and Zelenskyy are yet to have a single phone call. And Moscow has rewarded Beijing for what can ostensibly be described as picking a side, with Lavrov accusing the US of “playing with fire” in Taiwan in a speech at the United Nations in September (Japan Times, 2022).
Finally, China’s external propaganda has not shied away from parroting Russian talking points. A report by China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), a Prague-based think tank, shows how Chinese state media and embassies have disseminated the narrative of NATO culpability and legitimate Russian goals in the region, albeit with limited success (Karásková et al, 2022). When Russian state-media promoted a baseless story about dangerous US-funded Biolabs in Eastern Ukraine, the Global Times, a Chinese English-language state-media outlet, picked up the story as well (Global Times, 2022). Not only did this conspiracy theory legitimize Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, but it was also heavily picked up by fringe political groups across Europe and the United States (Brandt et al, 2022). If sowing doubt in the minds of target populations is a key component of hybrid warfare, then Beijing’s contribution to Moscow’s disinformation campaigns should be treated as a contribution to the war effort.
To be sure, Beijing has several times called for peace. And strategically speaking, it is highly probable that Xi and China do not want this conflict to drag on forever. But when calling for peace, Beijing has been calling for peace on Moscow’s terms. When calling for “the respect of all countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity” (CGTN, 2022), Beijing inherently refers to Russia’s security concerns as well. It is therefore difficult to consider these kinds of statements as anything else than explicit support for the Kremlin's narratives (Cox, 2022).
In conclusion
Critical readers will have noticed a fatal flaw in the argument I present: the dynamics of warfare are too different from those of international support to be duplicated so simplistically. For instance, the distinction between conventional and non-conventional warfare cannot be applied to international support, as expressing political support for another state is far more common than the label ‘non-conventional support’ would suggest. The aim of this essay, however, was not to build a theoretical framework to assess Chinese foreign policy but to point to the important role that Beijing’s political and narrative support play in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
China does not provide significant conventional support to Russia in the form of military or economic aid. However, by supporting its partner’s narratives in international fora and the information space, Beijing provides Moscow with political ammunition to continue the war effort. This is a form of support that employs a range of non-physical means while going under the radar for many in the world, which is why I refer to it as hybrid support. And there is a reason why Beijing has chosen this approach: the fundamentals of the Sino-Russian relationship mentioned in the introduction. In terms of methods, Zhongnanhai sits uncomfortably with the Kremlin’s choice of actions as it is conscious of the blowback costs. Yet, because it shares the Kremlin’s world view of a US-led democratic threat, Zhongnanhai has chosen to bet on its authoritarian partner. In 2023, China’s hybrid support – i.e., treading a fine line between openly supporting or condemning Russia while employing non-military state resources to support it – is likely to stay.
About the Author
Lukian De Boni works as a journalist for the Mainichi Shimbun's Brussels Office and is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). He obtained his M.A. in Contemporary East Asian Studies from the University of Duisburg-Essen, and his B.A. in History from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). He is also the President of European Guanxi.
The opinions expressed here are those of the writers and do not represent the views of European Guanxi.
Do you have an article you would like to share? Write for us.
References
Brandt, Jessica, Wirtschafter, Valerie, and Danaditya, Adya, 2022. Popular Broadcasters Spread Russian Disinformation about Ukraine Biolabs [Tech Stream]. Washington D.C.: Brookings. Available from: https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/popular-podcasters-spread-russian-disinformation-about-ukraine-biolabs/
Bro, Frank, 2022. Questions and concerns surrounding US biolabs in Ukraine. Global Times [Online], 18 March. Available from: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1255208.shtml
Chen, Aizhu, 2022. Russia is China's top oil supplier for 2nd month, Saudi volumes tumble – data. Reuters [Online], 20 July. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-is-chinas-top-oil-supplier-2nd-month-saudi-volumes-tumble-data-2022-07-20/
China Global Television Network, 2022. Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity foundation of common security - Chinese envoy [Online], 23 August. Available from: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-08-23/Chinese-envoy-calls-for-respect-for-sovereignty-territorial-integrity-1cJxFvGVdte/index.html
Cox, Michael, 2022. Chinese Puzzles – Putin’s Long War in Ukraine [Online]. Prague: China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe. Available from: https://chinaobservers.eu/chinese-puzzles-putins-long-war-in-ukraine/
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). Hybrid threats as a concept [Online]. Available from: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/
Ferris, Emily, and Nouwens, Veerle, 2022. Russia’s Vostok 2022 Military Drills: Not Size or Tanks, but Context [Online]. London: Royal United Services Institute. Available from: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-vostok-2022-military-drills-not-size-or-tanks-context
Gaidaev, Vitaly, 2022. Valyutnay atmosfera iuaniziruetsa. Kommersant [Online], 8 August. Available from: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5501988
Gotev, Georgi, 2023. US sees some Chinese companies helping Russia’s Ukraine effort. Euractiv [Online], 25 January. Available from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/china/news/us-sees-some-chinese-companies-helping-russias-ukraine-effort/
Grove, Thomas, 2022. Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, but Now Faces a Potential Quagmire. Wall Street Journal [Online], 6 March. Available from: https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-military-chief-promised-quick-victory-in-ukraine-but-now-faces-a-potential-quagmire-11646582366
He, Laura, 2022. 3 ways China and Russia are forging much closer economic ties. CNN Business [Online], 15 September. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/15/economy/china-russia-closer-ties-sco-summit-intl-hnk/index.html
Hmaidi, Antonia, and Chimits, Francois, 2022. 'China has shown no restraint in its trading with Russia'. Le Monde [Online], 9 September. Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/09/09/china-has-shown-no-restraint-in-its-trading-with-russia_5996409_23.html
Hunder, Max, 2022. Putin acknowledges China's concerns over Ukraine in sign of friction. Reuters [Online], 15 September. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-acknowledges-chinas-concerns-over-ukraine-sign-friction-2022-09-15/
The Japan Times, 2022. Russia's top envoy accuses Washington of 'playing with fire' around Taiwan [Online], 25 September. Available from: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/09/25/world/lavrov-warn-us-taiwan/
Karásková, Ivana; Bachulska, Alicja; Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Una Aleksandra; Godec, Tinkara; Karindi, Liisi; Leonte, Andreea; Shopov, Vladimir; Szunomár, Ágnes; and Šimalčík, Matej, 2022. Backing Russia on Ukraine: China’s Messaging in Central and Eastern Europe. Prague: China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe. Available from: https://chinaobservers.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/CHOICE_policy-paper_Backing-Russia-on-Ukraine_04_web.pdf
Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Shullman, David O., 2022. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine. (CSIS Briefs). Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine
Lau, Stuart, 2023. China to EU: Drop calls for Ukraine’s ‘complete victory’. Politico [Online], 8 February. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/drop-idea-complete-victory-ukraine-china-eu-volodymyr-zelenskyy-fu-cong-xi-jinping-russia/
Law, Tara, 2023. Russia Expects a Visit From China's Xi Jinping in the Spring, Ministry Says. Time [Online], 1 February. Available from: https://time.com/6251705/xi-jinping-visit-russia-china-spring/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=cb706ce9d9-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2023_02_02_05_07&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-cb706ce9d9-%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D
Lendon, Brad, 2022. Russia and China unite for live-fire naval exercises in waters near Japan. CNN [Online], 19 December. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/19/asia/russia-china-naval-exercises-intl-hnk-ml/index.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axioschina&stream=china
Ng, Kelly, 2023. Ukraine: US sanctions Chinese firm helping Russia's Wagner Group. BBC [Online], 27 January. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64421915
People’s Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021. Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng: There is No Limit to the Friendship, No Forbidden Zone to the Cooperation and No Ceiling to the Mutual Trust between China and Russia [Online]. Beijing. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202112/t20211203_10462034.html
People’s Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022. Wang Yi Meets with Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba of Ukraine [Online]. Beijing. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220924_10770931.html
People’s Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022. President Xi Jinping Had a Virtual Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin [Online]. Beijing. Available from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202212/t20221230_10999132.html?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=17d3914558-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2023_01_04_10_53&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-17d3914558-%5BLIST_EMAIL_ID%5D
Reuters, 2022. Russia's security chief begins two-day visit to China on Sunday [Online], 18 September. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-security-chief-begins-two-day-visit-china-sunday-2022-09-18/
Russian Federation. President of Russia, 2022. Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development [Online]. Moscow. Available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770
Russian Federation. The State Duma, 2022. Leaders of the State Duma factions met with Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress [Online]. Moscow. Available from: http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/55208/
Shevchenko, Vitaly, 2014. "Little green men" or "Russian invaders"? BBC [Online], 11 March. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154
Shi, Jiangtao, 2022. China hails strong Russia ties ‘no matter’ what, vows to safeguard common interests. South China Morning Post [Online], 19 April. Available from: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3174812/china-hails-strong-russia-ties-no-matter-what-vows-safeguard
Solmaz, Tarik, 2022. ‘Hybrid Warfare’: One Term, Many Meanings. Small Wars Journal [Online]. Available from: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-warfare-one-term-many-meanings
South China Morning Post, 2023. China, Russia criticise US, Europe for trying to sow discord between them [Online], 9 January. Available from: https://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/3206180/china-russia-criticise-us-europe-trying-sow-discord-between-them
TASS, Russian News Agency, 2022. Medvedev delivers Putin’s message to Xi Jinping [Online], 21 December. Available from: https://tass.com/politics/1553583
Voyger, Mark, 2021. What is “Hybrid Warfare,” Really? [Online]. Washington D.C.: Center for European Policy Analysis. Available from: https://cepa.org/article/what-is-hybrid-warfare-really/
Xu, Muyu, 2022. China's July Russian coal imports hit 5-yr high as West shuns Moscow. Reuters [Online], 22 August. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/chinas-july-russian-coal-imports-hit-5-yr-high-west-shuns-moscow-2022-08-20/
Comments