Belgrade by night, river, city image © Stevan Aksentijevic / Pixabay Content License / pixabay
Introduction
Current European sentiment on China is characterised by division and uncertainty, as the European Union’s (EU’s) official policy stance views China as a “partner for cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival.” Exasperated by heightened geopolitical tensions due to the Russia-Ukraine war, challenges threatening the political, economic, and ideological integrity of the EU demand a concerted response based on a common set of principles. China’s increasing presence in the region and beyond tests the strength of ideological coherence and challenges the grand vision of complete integration across the European continent.
Serbia has emerged as a key player in cultivating robust economic, political, diplomatic, and military ties with China, a maneuver that has complicated its unsteady path toward EU accession. This paper will provide an overview of the history of Serbia-China relations and analyse their importance in the context of Serbian accession to the EU and the current geopolitical climate in Europe under the context of “cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry.” Policy recommendations will also be presented addressing the dynamics of the EU-Serbia-China relationship.
History of Serbia-China-EU Relations
The development of Serbian diplomacy with Beijing and Brussels shares several important milestones that illustrate Belgrade’s strategy of dual engagement. Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009 and was granted candidate status in 2012 (European Council, 2024). The following year, Xi Jinping unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative, a grand strategic vision that would soon become a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. The initiative aimed to strengthen global diplomatic ties while offering an alternative to the Washington Consensus and Western-led development assistance. In 2014, Serbia commenced EU accession negotiations, but shortly after, in 2015, it joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This decision paved the way for China to expand its influence in the region (Green Finance and Development Center, n.d.).
The Serbia-China friendship dates back to 1955, when official diplomatic ties between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were established. This relationship continued under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, Serbia and Montenegro), when China abstained from voting on the introduction of sanctions against the FRY in 1992 and opposed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing efforts in 1999 (Ladjevac, 2024). Ultimately, NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade became a highly contentious event, straining tensions with the West and solidifying China’s presence in the region.
Although the EU is Serbia’s most important trade and political partner, China has become its largest investor following the signing of the Framework Agreement on Economic and Technological Infrastructure Cooperation in 2009, which was accompanied by the establishment of a strategic partnership (Vladisavljev, 2023). A main pillar of this framework is the ‘development and implementation of infrastructure projects, technical assistance for development plans, procurement, exchange of experiences, and other forms of cooperation’ (Official Gazette, 2009). Notable projects include the Pupin Bridge in Belgrade, which was the first Chinese-built bridge in Europe and officially opened with the attendance of Premier Li Keqiang (Mo, 2014).
The signing of this agreement was a catalyst for an influx of new projects including rail construction and motorway expansion (ECFR, n.d.). This was a significant achievement in Beijing’s influential expansion into Eastern Europe, as the agreement helped usher in the construction of the Belgrade-Budapest Railway. This is considered a ‘benchmark infrastructure project of the Belt and Road Initiative,’ because it will facilitate connection to the Piraeus port in Greece, where the Chinese group COSCO Shipping acquired a two-thirds stake in 2016 (Bali, 2022; Ladjevac, 2024; Rogers, 2024). Therefore, a strong relationship between China and Serbia is crucial for serving China’s economic interests and ensuring access to the EU’s markets.
Beyond infrastructure, a major turning point in the Serbia-China economic partnership occurred in 2019 when Serbia announced plans to purchase arms from China. Since then, Belgrade has received multiple deliveries of battle drones and the FK-3 air defence system (Bjeloš et al., 2023). Chinese special security forces were also granted access to drill in the town of Smederevo. Moreover, several of the Chinese firms operating in Serbia are sanctioned by the United States and other Western countries. Such firms include the Poly Group Corporation, which has been accused of violating sanctions included in the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Just Finance, n.d.). This is of great concern to the United States government and the European Parliament alike – as the presence of sanctioned foreign firms operating on the EU’s periphery carries the potential to raise security concerns. Furthermore, in 2022, “six Chinese Air Force Y-20 transport planes landed in Belgrade,” ‘reportedly carrying HQ-22 surface-to-air missile systems’ (Stojanovic, 2022). Given Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia over its actions in Ukraine, an increase in Chinese military technology presence in the region should prove to be worrisome for Brussels.
In October 2023, Serbia and China signed an 850-page bilateral trade agreement with China as part of the ‘shared future’ that the countries wish to achieve (Bjeloš et al., 2023). As a member of the 14+1 framework, China’s cooperation framework with Central and Eastern Europe, Serbia is soon ‘projected to hold an estimate of more than $7.9B in Chinese loans’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022; Kaczynski, 2022). As investment projects are ‘not bound by EU standards and regulations,’ this has implications for Chinese influence in Europe in terms of environmental standards, human rights, trading, and security. Except for Hungary, Eastern European countries have been increasingly turning away from China, despite most retaining membership in the 14+1 framework (except for the Baltic States) (Muzikarova, 2023). Consequently, 70% of the region’s Chinese investment is concentrated in Serbia (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022).
Xi Jinping’s visit to Europe in May 2024 came amidst historic tensions with the West, which was symbolised by his selection of three countries to visit: Serbia, Hungary, and France (Yu, 2024). Following a meeting in Belgrade, President Xi, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced they would “deepen and elevate the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Serbia…and build a new era of a community with a shared future between China and Serbia” (Stojanovic and Gec, 2024). In a response from the U.S. envoy for the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar, currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary, he underscored the need for ‘all of our partners and interlocutors to be very aware of China’s agenda in Europe and China’s agenda concerning the European Community’ (Taylor, 2024). Given recent strains in the EU-China relationship, an increase in diplomatic ties on the periphery puts pressure on Brussels, but also on Serbia’s bid for EU membership, which, according to Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević, ‘remains the country’s “ultimate strategic goal”’ (Mikovic, 2024). Although, for the foreseeable future, this does not seem within reach.
Accession to the EU and Current Challenges in Europe
Since 2009, Serbia’s progress towards EU accession has been minimal, with some accusing the country of democratic backsliding and veering off course for accession (Euronews, 2024). By December 2021, 22 out of 35 chapters for EU integration have been opened. Conversely, President Aleksandar Vučić has even stated that his country was ‘not enthusiastic about European Union membership anymore,’ due to the EU’s stringent criteria on foreign policy and sanctions (Preussen, 2023; European Commission, 2024). The Serbia 2023 Report of the European Commission outlines that the Free Trade Agreement signed with China is a “strategic concern” and that Belgrade failed to ‘make progress in line with the Declaration of the EU – Western Balkans Summit’ held in Tirana on 6 December 2022 (European Commission, 2023, p. 147). The report puts forth three recommendations:
‘Improve, as a matter of priority, [Serbia’s] alignment with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, including restrictive measures, and avoid actions and statements that go against EU positions on foreign policy.’
‘Continue to step up action to prevent any attempt to use the territory of Serbia and/or legal entities registered in Serbia for the circumvention of EU restrictive measures.’
‘Make credible efforts to close space for foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation, and take actions towards building societal resilience against it and other forms of hybrid threats.’
The recommendations above are contrary to Serbia’s current policy stance, which is designed to appease Beijing while at the same time extracting benefits from Brussels. Regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Serbia’s ambivalent condemnation of Russia, continued high-level visits and operation of flights to and from Moscow, and its entanglement with China will only further isolate and even segregate it from the rest of Europe. Despite these actions, bilateral trade with the EU increased to nearly EUR 40 billion in 2022. Ultimately, the EU’s 2023 assessment that Serbia is ‘moderately prepared’ (European Commission, 2023) in the area of common foreign, security, and defence policy should be reconsidered, given the continued strengthening of Belgrade's relationship with Beijing and its growing presence in Serbia’s political landscape. The question remains as to how long Serbia can ignore these recommendations and maintain this political balancing act.
An additional element complicating the situation in the Balkans is the question of Kosovo’s independence, with both Belgrade and Beijing sharing ideological alignment. Similarly, both nations reject the independence of Taiwan, underscoring their shared diplomatic priorities. During the Third Belt and Road Forum, Xi Jinping stated that ‘China firmly supports Serbia in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (MFA, 2023), effectively shutting out the possibility of Kosovan independence. Although this remains a priority for the EU, Serbia has been slow to foster progress – which is a major hurdle to EU accession. Belgrade’s close relationship with the PRC will only continue to obstruct the potential for normalisation of relations with Kosovo, and continuing down the current path will further strengthen Beijing’s assertion of territorial unity regarding Taiwan. Thus, this mutually reinforcing system will continue to be a strategic obstacle for the EU in maintaining continental unity.
Recommendations and Conclusion
The EU should better acknowledge that the countries in the Western Balkans have other alternatives to EU membership and therefore work to bolster and reaffirm its commitment to highlighting the importance of multilateralism in the region. This can be done through promulgating rules and norms and setting standards for engagement with China. Even among EU Member States, political and ideological fragmentation continues to be a threat to EU-wide policy-making. Hence, proactive steps must be taken to positively influence states situated on the frontier of the EU’s sphere of influence. For this reason, the EU should allocate more resources to supporting the Western Balkans to illustrate the economic and security benefits of EU membership and integration as a whole.
At the same time, the EU must emphasise that Serbia’s close relationship with China and Russia has the potential to harm the Belgrade-Brussels relationship, given Serbia’s geographic and territorial importance to the EU. However, the EU is often reluctant to exert pressure on Belgrade due to Serbia’s critical role as a buffer zone (Barber, 2024). This geopolitical consideration complicates the EU’s approach to Serbia, as the country remains pivotal in managing migration flows into Europe and also possesses large deposits of lithium, which are of substantial importance to the EU’s green transition. Consequently, politicians in Kosovo have called out the EU and the U.S. for being soft on Serbia (Hall and Russel, 2024) However, the EU is confronted with a delicate balancing act, striving to protect Western interests while avoiding the risk of further isolating Serbia. If the current trends of Serbian integration with China and Russia continue, Serbia would not likely fulfill the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession.
As highlighted, China has become an important actor in terms of economic, political, military, and diplomatic concerns. Whether its impact on the Belgrade-Brussels relationship is currently important for Vučić or not, it should be of paramount concern for Ursula von der Leyen. Economic engagement with the PRC is not intrinsically bad, and the EU should actively explore ways to strategically manage competition in a way that provides economic benefits and safeguards intellectual property rights and political integrity. However, unchecked engagement with China has the potential to undermine EU security policy and strategy in the long term. Thus, the EU should work fervently to outline the long-term benefits of normalising Serbian defence policy, economic relations, and respect for international law.
Both the EU and Serbia face their own political balancing acts. Serbia’s growing alignment with the PRC presents a challenge to its EU accession ambitions, as the EU navigates its own complex relationship with China – characterised by cooperation, competition, and strategic rivalry. At the same time, the EU has been reluctant to put sufficient pressure on Serbia to challenge its growing relationship with the PRC. As China and Serbia continue to forge a “shared future” through diplomatic cooperation, investment, and free trade, tensions in the Belgrade-Brussels relationship will continue to rise. While acknowledging Serbia’s geopolitical advantages and the potential risks of isolation, the EU should place an increased effort on highlighting the benefits of multilateralism and the benefits of EU membership steering Serbia back on the path towards EU accession. Ultimately, fostering a strong partnership between Belgrade and Brussels is essential for ensuring stability in the EU’s periphery and advancing its broader mission.
This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Douglas Brenton Anderson is a research intern at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, a think-tank based in Washington DC. He holds an MA in Public Policy Administration from Tsinghua University, Beijing, and an MSc in Innovation, Human Development, and Sustainability from the University of Geneva, Switzerland. He is currently the Editor-in-Chief at European Guanxi.
This article was edited by Sardor Allayarov and Luca Rastelli.
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