Every crisis contains an element of change and a chance to reflect current patterns. An often-quoted example is given by the Chinese equivalent 危机 (wēijī) composed of the word 危 (wēi) for danger or threat and 机(jī) for chance or opprtunity. Similar to their Western counterparts many of the young Chinese generation have conceived the strained times of the pandemic as a turning point to reflect upon their working lifestyle for a recalibration of the work-life balance. This article will discuss the concept of 躺平 (tǎng píng), translated as simply as concept of “laying down”.
Living to work or working to live
Since its opening towards the West, the People's Republic of China has undergone a tremendous transition, however mutually requiring enormous efforts from its citizens. Several enterprises insist on the 996 rule (996 工作制 gōngzuòzhì), which translates into working from 9 am to 6 pm. for six days a week or a 72 hour week. Even the Chinese labor code forbids more than 44 hours of work per week, but those practices are still common, especially in the tech industry and the growing digital sector (Li Xiaotian, 2019, p. 55). However, the Chinese Generation Z has started to put those practices into question, searching for work-life balance. Prior to discussing this movement, a short overview of the Chinese educational system shall give an insight about the realities of young Chinese citizens, searching for their position in society.
Like in many Asian societies, the Chinese tradition is highly influenced by the ideas of its renowned scholar and philosopher Confucius (孔夫子 Kǒng Zǐ ). According to those concepts, the family presents a miniature depiction of the universe. Here, moral duties and obligations are assigned among family members according to their status. This translates into mutual care, honoring the parents and elder people, taking care of the family and ensuring a certain degree of prosperity (Berthrong and Berthrong, 2000, p. 17). Simultaneously the concept of meritocracy has become deeply embedded in Chinese society, especially during the process of opening up in the 1980s and transitioning from a Socialist Society to a Socialist-Market Society. Behind this there is the ideology that through merits people can prove their fitness to deserve a higher ranked social position.
Therefore, the 高考 (gaokao) fulfills a filtering function, claiming to fulfill educational meritocracy. Disregarding the social or political background only those exams shall decide upon the future position of the examinees (Ye, 2013, p. 873). Every year, after twelve years of schooling millions of young Chinese participate in those two days exams, with police even roadblocking the whole district, so that students can take their exams without further distraction. The contestants face a huge pressure as not only their whole future, but that of their families too, depends on those exams.. Admission to prestigious universities depends on the final score in the Gaokao (Pires and Manuel Duarte João, 2019, p. 169). The student’s performance in the Gaokao relates directly to family honor, teacher salary and district reputation. Therefore, it is not too brave, arguing that those exams are the most important in the life of a young Chinese citizen (Wang et al., 2022, p. 677). Critics argue, that focusing on testing suppresses the creative development of the students, turning those into “test machines”, that only learn to pass the exams without developing own interest into the subjects (Pires and Manuel Duarte João, 2019, p. 169). Consequently, this leads to a high stress of not just studying permanently but also fulfilling the expectations of family and society (ibid. p.172).
Admittedly, despite the promise to ensure educational justice, socio-demographic factors play an important role in the final success of the exams, such as the region and the social status of the family. However, this is also applicable for Western democratic educational systems. Taking the case of Germany, educational success is highly dependent on the social status of the family. Students from an academic household are ten times more likely to do a PhD than their counterparts from a working class background (Meyer-Guckel et al., 2021, p. 3).
Generation Z and a recalibrating of work life balance
As already mentioned in the introduction, every crisis serves as an incentive to reflect upon current patterns, reflecting upon potential new ways. In the US, more than 4 million people started quitting their jobs, in a phenomenon called “The Great Resignation”. Paradoxically, during the lockdown measures people were holding on to their jobs, yet, with a lifting of most Covid restrictions, many especially knowledge workers left their jobs. Working from home, avoiding daily commuting, gave employees the opportunity to reflect upon their relation with work and their professional identity (Serenko, 2022). Appealing to that, a survey among young Gen Z in Germany revealed that a majority would prefer more free time over a higher salary. Simultaneously enjoying life more than identifying with a job (Randstadt, 2022, p. 15).
Responding to this Western trend, among the Chinese Gen Z the concept of of 躺平 (tǎng píng), has gained momentum, translated as lying down or laying flat, doing nothing. This movement began in April 2021 with a post by Luo Huazhong (username “Kind-Hearted Traveler” on Baidu), where he reported about having left his factory job in 2016, as he felt, it might not give purpose anymore. After that he cycled the country from Sichuan to Tibet and back, now living a modest lifestyle to escape the pressures of a rising competition in society (Elsie Chen, 2021). This comes along the concept of bai lan (摆烂,) or let it rot in English, where Chinese Gen Z starts to watch out for psychological well-being instead of economic prosperity. Many feel a sort of frustration due to the rising uncertainties of those turbulent times (Ni, 2022). Nevertheless, here a clash of generations is taking place as well, with the concept being perceived as negative.
Working from East to West or West to East? Toward a Global Gen Z
Like in the West with employers criticizing the new demands of Gen Z, in China, this movement has been perceived with a sort of criticism, with the official news agency Xinhua posting, "Lying flat" is shameful, where is the sense of justice? (“躺平” 可耻，哪来的正义感?”) (Xinhua, 2021). However, the party affiliated newspaper Guangming Daily argues thatthe tang ping movement should not be discounted, as: “If China wants to cultivate diligence in the young generation it should first try to improve their quality of life” (Wang, 2021).
In conclusion, Chairman Xi Jinping emphasized that “Young people are the future of every nation and of the world"(Xinhua, 2022). Nevertheless, as this contribution has discussed, a global Gen Z is coming together in their pursuit for new purposes in life, searching for their personal futures in societies that, thanks to new opportunities and uncertainties, are changing at an unprecedented pace, opening new ways to learn as every crisis contains the aspect of change.
Stephan Raab holds two M.A.'s in political science and adult education from the Otto-Friedrich University Bamberg. Currently, he works as advisor for civic education at the German conference of Bishops. Besides that, he is an editor for the Institute for Greater Europe. His research interests are mostly in the field of educational diplomacy and global education, focusing on global interrelatedness. You can find his works on twitter at @raab_stephan.
The opinions expressed here are those of the writers and do not represent the views of
European Guanxi.
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References
Berthrong, J. and Berthrong, E. (2000) Confucianism: A short introduction, Oneworld, Oxford.
Elsie Chen (2021) These Chinese Millennials Are ‘Chilling,’ and Beijing Isn’t Happy [Online], The New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/world/asia/china-slackers-tangping.html.
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Randstadt (2022) New Work: #1 – Wofür arbeiten wir und was ist uns wichtig, Eschborn.
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