The European Elections: Far-Right Gains, Green Setbacks, and the Future of EU-China Relations in Renewable Energy and Green Deal Policy

European flag, European elections, Eu election image © kdg2020/ Pixabay Content License / pixabay

Introduction

The year 2024 certainly was a year that will be remembered as not just any, but THE election year. In total, 64 countries held national elections, in addition to the European Union Parliament elections in June, which will prove quite consequential for the next 5 years (Ewe, 2023). Indeed, far-right parties have made significant political gains. The Patriots for Europe (PfE), which replaced the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, increased its representation from 49 seats to 84, making it the third-biggest group overall. Meanwhile, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) also gained seats, rising from 69 to 78 (Archick, 2024). The considerable wins of the French and German far-right, as well as the German Green party losing a whopping half of its seats, were the talk of the town. The victories by right-wing parties in France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium have triggered significant political upheaval. In France, President Macron called for snap elections to address the shifting political landscape, while in Belgium, Prime Minister Alexander De Croo resigned following his party's losses in both national and European elections (Reinsch and Alsaleh, 2024). 

As these changes ripple through European politics, they also stand to impact the EU’s external relations with emerging global competitors such as China. This article attempts to provide an overview of how the 2024 European Parliament elections will impact EU-China relations for the next five years. First, this article will report on the Parliament’s political groups’ positions and rhetoric on future EU-China relations, particularly in balancing collaboration and competition. Second, it examines the challenges the EU faces in maintaining its Green Deal ambitions and commitment to sustainable energy. The article analyzes how shifts in political priorities, such as rising far-right influence and the declining focus on climate policies, impact the EU’s dependency on Chinese renewable technologies. 

First, the EU’s policy and economic strategy towards China remains blurry at best. In the 2019 Strategic Outlook on China, the EU officially introduced the tripartite "partner for cooperation and negotiation, an economic competitor and a systematic rival" (Bartsch and Wessling, 2023, pp.8; EEAS, 2023). Then, in March 2023, Van der Leyen introduced the ‘de-risking’ strategy towards China. Considered to signal the "rejection of the US-led push for de-coupling" (Arendse, 2023, para. 2), the de-risking strategy aims to gradually reduce the European Union's dependence on Chinese materials and commodities (Bartsch and Wessling, 2023). This marks a clear shift from the EU's previous motivation to enact a Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CIA), halted after retaliatory sanctions. 

While the EU’s ultimate foreign policy decision-making body is the European Council, the European Parliament’s role cannot be ignored. The EP’s trade function is to assess and decide on the approval or rejection of newly negotiated international trade agreements proposed by the European Commission. This task has become increasingly pressing due to several factors: the reduction in trade with Russia, the ongoing implementation of a de-risking strategy with China, and growing criticism surrounding the EU-Mercosur agreement (Reinsch and Alsaleh, 2024). Consequently, new trade deals will face serious scrutiny in the EP and potentially slow-down de-risking initiatives from China. To better understand how this legislative dynamic may unfold, one must critically review the political groups' manifestos and the number of seats they secured during the June 2024 elections (European Parliament, 2024).

The following table provides an overview of EP parties’ position and rhetoric on future EU-China cooperation and competition. These statements were gathered after carefully analyzing the parties’ 2024 Manifestos, published in the lead-up to the June parliamentary elections. 

Group	Parties	Mentions of China and the parties’ position in the 2024 Manifestos
EPP (188 seats)	European’s People Party (EPP, 2024)	General approach towards China is to “de-risk, not de-couple” (p.11) Develop a long-term strategy towards strategic areas “including China and Taiwan” (p.5) Challenge economic competitors like China (and the US), while defending strategically important European sectors against unfair practices (p.11) Shield strategic infrastructure from takeovers, “notably China” (p.11) Foster special cooperation with like-minded in a “Union of Democracies to remain competitive vis-à-vis dominant competitors such as China” (p.12)
S&D (136 seats)	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (The Party of European Socialists, 2024)	Rebalance EU relations with China, to promote EU values and protect interests (p.20)
PfE (84 seats)	Patriots for Europe	No mention of China in their manifesto
ECR (78 seats)	European Conservativesand Reformists Party (ECR, 2024)	Prioritize de-risk and adopt a firm approach to EU-China relations (p.4) Balances need for engagement with China while addressing human rights violations and advocating for stronger ties with like-minded partners such as Taiwan and other Pacific allies (p.4)
Renew Europe (77 seats)	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, 2024)	Implement Magnitsky-style sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong, while ensuring protection for European residents from extradition to China (p.5) oppose China's efforts to challenge Taiwan’s autonomy or alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait (p.5) efforts to conclude the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is conditioned upon China’s commitment to human rights, democracy, etc. (p.7) using de-risking and diversification initiatives to reduce dependency on China (p.7 and p.12)
European Democratic Party (EDP, 2024)	Improve AI competitiveness vis-à-vis China and the US (p.15) Strengthen EU integration in security, defense and foreign affairs against emerging empires, such as China (p.16)

Green-EFA (53 seats)	European Greens (European Greens, 2024)	Promote robust human rights policy that starts with “de-risking EU supply chains and increasing self-sufficiency” (p.41) Needs a rights-based decentralized approach to digitalization against “China-style state control” (p.22)   Stress the need for a common EU policy on China to ensure international peace and security which risks being jeopardized by the Chinese threat on Taiwan’s independence (p.41)
European Free Alliance (EFA, 2024)	Make strategic public investments to compete with China (p.13) United the EU to remain competitive against protectionist US and enlarged BRICS (p.10)
European Pirate Party (European Pirate Party, 2024)	Develop space capacities which are dominated by US and China
Volt Europe (Volt, 2024)	China is considered a systemic rival
ESN (25 seats)	Europe of Sovereign Nations	No mention of China in their manifesto
The Left (GUE/NGL) (46 seats)	The European Left party	No mention of China in their manifesto

The table demonstrates political parties’ positions on EU-China relations in their manifestos published before the 2024 elections. Interestingly, the level and scope of interest and priorities for EU-China relations varies across parties. On the one hand, the EPP focuses on the economic challenge and security threat from China. On the other hand, the Renew Europe group emphasizes mitigating the adverse effects of China’s policies on European and Taiwanese citizens. Both the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) and the Patriots for Europe (PfE), which were formed after the dissolution of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, did not provide an official position on EU-China relations and priorities in their manifestos. For background, the ID fractured over disagreements about extremism, driven mainly by the expulsion of Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) following a backlash against controversial comments by its candidate, Maximilian Krah. This led Marine Le Pen and others to distance themselves from the AfD, resulting in the creation of PfE and a separate bloc, the ESN, led by the AfD (Starcevic and Wax, 2024). Interestingly, none of the manifestos presented areas for cooperation with China, except for climate-related issues, which have typically not been deemed controversial. This essay will comment on the future prospects of the EU climate policies and areas for potential cooperation with China. 

To understand the future trajectory of European Parliament decisions on policies affecting EU-China relations, it is essential to analyze voting patterns on China-related resolutions during the Parliament’s ninth term (2019–2024). Indeed, consensus-building towards a more assertive position against China can be discerned, as plenary support for this stance was consistently above 85% (Chimits and Stec, 2024). Despite the far-right achieving a significant victory, Von der Leyen assertively claimed that “the center is holding” (Reinsch and Alsaleh, 2024, para.3), which can instill the belief that the strong record of consensus-building and assertive policymaking against Chinese influence will remain. 

However, the election outcome sets the political stage for how MEPs and EU Commissioners will navigate a response to the ‘China challenge’. While right-wing groups do not present an official rhetoric and policy position on China in their manifestos, the bigger worry for EU lawmakers is that the elections reflect voters’ declining enthusiasm for issues such as sustainable and green energy. Consequently, the European Green Deal is loathed by right-wing MEPs, and the climate-change agenda risks losing urgent prominence (Cater, Gros and Guillot, 2024). Indeed, the EU’s new strategic agenda for the institutional cycle of 2024-2029 already reflects this critical backpedaling , with the main priorities being defense, security and migration issues, while the climate agenda is significantly marginalized (European Council, 2024). Already in her attempts to gain a second mandate as Commission President, in her State of the Union address, Von der Leyen expressed that the climate agenda was being shifted to an economic one (European Commission, 2023). Thus, as climate action becomes increasingly tied to economic priorities, Europe and China are likely to engage in a mix of rivalry and collaboration (Oertel, Tollmann and Tsang, 2020). 

If the EU does not prioritize reducing its dependency on China for renewable energy and electric vehicles, its policy momentum could falter. Over the last five years, China has utilized clean energy developments as drivers of economic growth, with China investing significantly more in this sector than Europe or the United States. China dominates renewable energy manufacturing, producing 90% of global solar panels, over 70% of lithium batteries, and 65% of wind turbines (Ives and Sum, 2024). In response, Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra emphasized the need for the EU to implement stronger policies to reduce reliance on Beijing and develop domestic manufacturing capabilities to stimulate European economies (Lau, 2024).

Addressing concerns over market competition, on October 30th 2024, the EU also increased tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EV) to 45.3%, aiming to protect its nascent EV industry (Blenkinsop, 2024). To remain competitive in a low-carbon world, the EU must not only reduce dependency on external players but also invest heavily in green technologies to compete for markets, set global standards, and exert influence (Oertel, Tollmann and Tsang, 2020). However, the EU is falling behind in its global competitiveness. A stark example of this decline is the recent bankruptcy filing of the Swedish battery developer Northvolt in the US, as the company struggled with mounting debt (Lahiri, 2024). As Northvolt's Chief Strategy Officer, Patrik Andersson, warned, delays in Europe's transition to battery-powered vehicles risk ceding significant ground to global competitors, mainly from China (Ewing and Eddy, 2024). This highlights the urgent need for the EU to bolster its domestic green technology sector to maintain its position in the global market and secure long-term economic and environmental sustainability.

In conclusion, the European Parliament’s policy direction, particularly concerning green energy, reflects the challenges of balancing collaboration and rivalry with China. The recent election results signal significant setbacks for the European Green Deal, influencing how the EU manages its dependence on Chinese renewable energy products while striving to reduce reliance. This precarious dynamic of cooperation and competition underscores the complexity of EU-China relations. Moreover, Trump’s reelection and his administration’s transactional approach to climate policies could further reshape the EU’s strategy. His emphasis on fossil fuels and skepticism toward renewable energy may pressure Brussels to enhance its competitiveness against Chinese renewable energy products while navigating global trade tensions and advancing its sustainability goals.

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinions of European Guanxi, its leadership, members, partners, or stakeholders, nor of those of its editors or staff. They have been formulated by the author in their full capacity, and shall not be used for any other purposes other than those they are intended for. European Guanxi assumes no liability or responsibility deriving from the improper use of the contents of this report. Any false facts, errors, and controversial opinions contained in the articles are proper and exclusive of the authors. European Guanxi or its staff and collaborators cannot be held responsible or legally liable for the use of any and all information contained in this document.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Caroline Seil is an Advanced Master’s candidate in International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University and the Clingendael Institute. Her academic pursuits have equipped her with in-depth expertise in Chinese foreign policy and proficiency in Mandarin, honed through academic exchanges in Shanghai and Hong Kong. During her internship at the Permanent Mission of Luxembourg to the United Nations in New York, Caroline worked closely on multilateral negotiations, representing Luxembourg’s interests in key discussions on human rights, sustainable development, and international peace and security.

This article was edited by Luca Rastelli and Maria Kienzle.

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